The “Googling Juror”

By on March 21, 2012

In an on-line article titled, “Rely on Instructions to Curb the Socially Networked Juror” (3/19/12), Dr. Ken Broda-Bahm writes that “the ‘Googling Juror’ has emerged as a massive concern in the courts with plenty of stories on the process being thrown into mistrial by panelists who had to look up a fact, couldn’t take their finger off the Tweet button, and felt the need to “friend” parties, attorneys, and other jurors.” Dr. Broda-Bahm references a new article in the Duke Law & Technology Review (St. Eve & Zuckerman, 2012) titled, "Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of Social Media" that discusses a survey of 140 former jurors. He quotes a juror as saying that “nothing” could prevent her from using social media during the trial. The good news is that of a sample of 140 jurors surveyed, only 6 reported a temptation to use social media during their trial, and none of those 6 succumbed to the temptation.

In her article, the Hon. Amy J. St. Eve (Northern District of Illinois) and her law clerk, Michael  A. Zuckerman, discuss the juror anecdotes that leave trial lawyers sleepless: the Arkansas death sentence set aside by a tweeting juror, the British juror who conducted a Facebook poll on how she should vote in deliberations, and the Florida juror who may face jail time for “friending” a defendant. Although all these anecdotal examples are important cautionary tales, Dr. Broda-Bahm contends that they do not define the common experience of most jurors.

As a possible solution to social networking abuses, he recommends asking the court for specific social media instructions that take the additional step of explaining why the jurors are being asked to refrain from social networking during trial. However, will a social media instruction be sufficient to curb social networking behavior among jurors?

 

Filed under Dr. Ken Broda-, Duke, Facebook, friending, googling juror, Hon. Amy J. St. Eve, Jury Instructions, Law, Litigation Issues and Factors, Review', St. Eve & Zimmerman, Technology, Tweeting Tagged with

LexisNexis Nominates Blog As One Of Best!

By on October 28, 2011

LexisNexis Top 25 Tort Blog NomineeThe LexisNexis Litigation Resource Community announced today that it has nominated the ToxicTortLitigationBlog for National Top 25 honors among Tort Blogs.  LexisNexis’ Press Release stated:

We are inviting tort law practitioners to comment on our list of nominees. If you’d like to request that readers support your nomination, please ask them to comment on the announcement post on our Litigation Resource Community…

Each comment is counted as a vote toward the supported blog. To submit a comment, visitors need to log on to their free LexisNexis Communities account.  If you haven’t previously registered, you can do so on the Litigation Resource Community for free. The comment box is at the very bottom of the  blog nomination page. The comment period for nominations ends on Nov. 17, 2011.  We will then post the Top 25 Tort Blogs of 2011. Thereafter, our community will vote to choose the Top Blog through a Zoomerang survey.

Filed under LexisNexis, Litigation Issues and Factors, nomination, Top 25 Tort Blogs, Toxic Tort Litigation Blog, Toxictortlitigationblog.com, vote, voting Tagged with

No Causal Link On Cell Phone Cancer Risk

By on June 10, 2011

Consumer Reports, among others, reported this week that the International Agency for Research on Cancer ("IARC"), which is part of the World Health Organization ("WHO"), has classified low-level radiation from cell phones as "possibly carcinogenic to humans" based on limited evidence linking cell phone use to glioma, a type of brain cancer.  Although Consumer Reports concluded in its article that IARC’s action was based on "limited evidence" and doesn’t "convincingly" link typical cell phone use with cancer, an American public that often skims only headlines of articles, may be susceptible to appeals of sympathy by plaintiff lawyers representing long-time cell phone users with brain cancers.  Throughout the 1980’s the utility industry battled spurious claims, premised upon junk science, that electromagnetic field radiation was responsible for "cancer clusters" of child leukemias and other dreaded diseases.  Although virtually every major EMF toxic tort claim was successfully defended by industry over a period of years, tens of millions of dollars was spent defending these lawsuits, which were brought in courts all  across the country.  As in the case of low dose radiation from cell phone use, there were  millions of millions of potential plaintiffs in the EMF cases and all of the prospective utility industry defendants had deep pockets. Following issuance of the IARC release, a spokeswoman for the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") stated that FCC currently requires that all cell phones meet safety standards based upon the advice of federal health and safety agencies.  Moreover, according to the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results Program ("SEER"), the incidence of brain cancer in the United States has actually declined over recent years as cell phone use has skyrocketed.  Despite these reassuring pronouncements, well-heeled plaintiff lawyers may bring some cases as trial balloons to test industry resolve based upon other equally ambiguous pronouncements, such as the contention that cell phone use can affect "brain function".  As in the cases brought against chemical manufacturers in the 1980’s,  which alleged that chemicals cause generic  "immune system dysfunction", enterprising plaintiffs may attribute any number of injuries to purported "brain function" impacts.  Hopefully, courts will continue to exercise their gatekeeper roles to maintain some semblance of scientific rigor in the courtroom to exclude inconclusive science  if these cases are brought. 

Filed under brain cancer, cell phones, Contaminants & Toxins, Federal Communications Commission, Industries, International Agency for Cancer Research, Litigation Issues and Factors, Toxic Tort/Product Liability Litigation Tagged with

Promoting Diversity in the Courtroom

By on May 24, 2011

 

Judge Harold Baer, Jr., who sits on the SDNY bench, has the courage of his convictions to do right even when others disagree.  In October 2010, Judge Baer issued an order in a class action litigation In Re: Gildan Activewear, Inc., Securities Litigation 08-cv-5048 directing two of the largest plaintiff class action law firms to “make every effort” to put at least one woman and one minority lawyer on the case. Although Judge Baer advised counsel that his order was not intended to be critical of lead counsel or their firms, he considered diversity considerations  goals that he would urge be met in similar cases that would come before him in the future.  Over his years of judicial service, Judge Baer was impressed that so many of the law firm litigation teams in his courtroom lacked diversity.  Judge Baer expressed concern over the lack of minority and female lawyers in law firms generally and saw the counsel approval process as a tool at his disposal to address what he considered a persistent problem.  Complaints by members of the bar that Judge Baer’s directive was an abuse of his counsel approval powers under thePrivate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 miss the point entirely.  Judge Baer’s intention was not to impact stare decisis under the act.  Rather, it was a courageous effort by a federal district judge to call attention to a serious problem in our profession.  We applaud Judge Baer.

Filed under class action litigation, ethnic diversity, gender diversity, Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., In Re Gildan Activewear, Inc, law firm diversity, Litigation Issues and Factors, minority lawyers, racial diversity Tagged with , ,

Court Rejects Toxic Telephone Pole Lawsuit

By on May 23, 2011

On November 6, 2009, we reported here concernining a case of first impression brought by the Ecological Rights Foundation (“ERF”) in federal court in California.  In her decision, dated March 31, 2011, the Hon. Saundra Brown Armstrong, sitting in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (Oakland Division), dismissed ERF’s  environmental claims brought  against Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) and Pacific Bell Telephone (“Pacific Bell”).  The Ecological Rights Foundation alleged that the Defendants’ wooden utility and telephone poles were pressure treated with an oil-based pentachlorophenol preservative which was “oozing” to the surface and being washed off of the Poles, thereby contaminating San Francisco Bay and adjacent waterways.  As a result of the migration of this material over time from the Poles into the soils, ERF alleged that “dioxin-like” compounds were released into the environment placing surrounding homeowners, commercial fisherman and the general public at significant risk.  As a practical matter, if ERF had prevailed, PG&E and Pacific Bell may have had to replace tens of thousands of Poles throughout California.

In dismissing the case, which was brought pursuant to the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), the Court examined the required showings under each statute.  The CWA distinguishes between point and nonpoint sources.  A point source is defined in the statute as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”  All other sources of pollution are characterized as “nonpoint sources.”  To succeed, ERF had to demonstrate that the Defendants’ discharges were point source discharges., looking for an attorney ? here is a speeding ticket defense that you can count on at any time.

In dismissing the CWA claim, the Court held that “point and nonpoint sources are not distinguished by the kind of pollution they create or by activity causing the pollution, but rather by whether the pollution reaches the water through a confined, discrete conveyance.”

The key issue in the analysis of ERF’s RCRA claim was whether the chemical preservatives used on the Poles qualified as a “solid waste” within the meaning of RCRA.  The term “solid waste” is statutorily defined as “discarded material.”  Although not defined by statute, EPA regulations specify that “discarded material” includes any material that is “abandoned.”  ERF alleged that solid waste was disposed of into the environment when the chemical preservative leaked, spilled or dripped from the Poles due to rain, and when dust impregnated with the chemical is blown into the air during dry seasons.  In dismissing the RCRA claim, the Court held that the “flaw in plaintiff’s theory of disposal is that in this case, there is no allegation that Defendants engaged in any conduct that resulted in the discharge of the chemical preservative. To the contrary, Plaintiff merely alleges that the purported contamination is the result of natural forces – mainly, rain and wind… Such allegations, on their face, are insufficient to establish that Defendants engaged in the ‘disposal’ of hazardous waste under § 6972(a)(1)(B).”  The Court rejected Plaintiff’s theory that the “passive” spilling or leaking of materials from a place of containment into the environment constitutes “disposal” of solid waste.  In so holding, the Court distinguished prior cases that found that leakage fromgasoline USTs may be actionable under RCRA.  The UST holdings are only applicable to situations where the discharge of hazardous waste leaked or spilled from a container intended to hold the waste.  In contrast, the Court found that “the Poles are not containers; but rather, they were used to suspend wires for the transmission of electricity for PG&E and data for Pacific Bell.”  Thus, liability under RCRA ¶ 7002 did not attach based on the “discharge” of chemical preservatives from the Poles attributable to natural forces, such as rain and wind.

Filed under Bell', Clean Water Act, Contaminants & Toxins, dioxin, Litigation Issues and Factors, Penta, Pentachlorophenol, PG&E, Public Utilities, RCRA, telephone poles, Toxic Tort/Product Liability Litigation Tagged with

Conflicts Of Interest Involving Corporate Affiliates

By on September 27, 2010

In GSI Commerce Solutions, Inc. v. BabyCenter LLC, No. 09-2790, the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling of SDNY Judge Jed S. Rakoff, who disqualified the Blank Rome law firm from representing a company adverse to a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, which was a client of Blank Rome.

The Second Circuit’s ruling is noteworthy because it addressed for the first time whether a law firm infringed on its duty of loyalty by taking on a representation adverse to an existing client’s corporate affiliate. In disqualifying Blank Rome, Judge Rakoff found that the overlap between BabyCenter LLC and Johnson & Johnson in effect made them a single company for various purposes. Judge Rakoff observed that BabyCenter LLC did not have a separate in-house legal department, but instead relied exclusively upon the in-house lawyers at Johnson & Johnson for legal advice.  Drawing upon extensive discussion by other courts as well as the ABA, the Second Circuit held that a law firm cannot take on a matter adverse to an affiliate if it diminishes the parent client’s level of confidence in its lawyers.

The Court first examined the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which provide that a “lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as parent or subsidiary.” ABA Model Rule of Prof’l Conduct 1.7 cmt. 34 (2006). This statement embodies what is often termed the “entity theory” of representation. However, the exception to this rule is that an attorney may not accept representation adverse to a client affiliate if “circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer.”

For its own part, Blank Rome argued that no conflict existed because: (1) the dispute between GSI and BabyCenter involved matters unrelated to Blank Rome’s Johnson & Johnson matters; and (2) Johnson & Johnson had waived any conflict by signing Blank Rome’s engagement letter. Both of these arguments proved unpersuasive to the unanimous appeals court. In particular, the Second Circuit observed that Blank Rome’s engagement letter contained provisions that might constitute a waiver by Johnson & Johnson of some, but not all, corporate affiliate conflicts. However, these conflict waivers were specifically limited to patent litigation and, even more specifically, to matters brought by generic drug manufacturers. Therefore, the Second Circuit held, Blank Rome failed to “contract around” the corporate affiliate conflict at issue. 

In a footnote, Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr., writing for the Court, stated that the Circuit was not addressing issues that would arise if a blanket waiver had been executed and left open how it might rule in those circumstances.

Filed under ABA, Blank Rome, Conduct', conflict waiver, Conflicts of Interest, corporate affiliate, disqualification, entity theory" of representation, Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, Hon. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Johnson & Johnson, Litigation Issues and Factors, Model, Professional, Rules, Second Circuit Tagged with ,

No General Causation? No Specific Causation? No Problem!

By on January 8, 2010

BNA Toxics Law Reporter reported on December 31, 2009, that a Michigan Appeals Court affirmed a mold exposure verdict for $303,260, finding that expert testimony was not necessary under Michigan State law to prove either general causation or specific causation.  In Genna v. Jackson, Mich. Ct. App., No. 285746, the Michigan Court Of Appeals (Oakland Circuit Court) affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s post-judgment motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial. Based upon a review of the decision, it is not disputed ( at least by this writer) that defendant’s negligent conduct resulted in substantial  flooding in the plaintiffs’ home and the gross mold contamination that resulted. Plaintiff’s microbial expert identified two molds in the home–penicillum and aspergillus–which he testified at trial could affect human health and pose safety issues.  Plaintiffs’ children began to experience what the court described as "flu-like symptoms including: diarrhea, vomiting, congestion and nosebleeds".  Over a period of months, these symptoms worsened and the symptoms did not respond to aggressive treatment.  Plaintiffs did not call an expert to testify that these symptoms were the result of the mold contamination. Nonetheless, the appeals court held that plaintiff did not have to demonstrate that the alleged toxin is "capable" of causing injuries like those suffered by the children, let alone requiring the plaintiffs to prove that these children’s symptoms were caused by mold exposure. The court reasoned as follows: "This is not a complicated case: the children were removed from the home, the mold was discovered, and the children recovered".  Thus, the court based its decision on "circumstantial evidence that would ‘facilitate reasonable inferences of causation, not mere speculation’."  With due respect to the appellate panel, which was obviously impressed with the graphic description of "patches of mold of all different colors all over the walls and ceilings in her kitchen, family room and dining area", this is a really bad decision and a potentially dangerous precedent in Michigan!  It is a mistake to base toxic tort causation on a temporal relationship,i.e., the "children were removed from the home, the mold was discovered, and children recovered."  Flu-like symptoms can be caused by……well, the flu.  That the children’s symptoms went away could signify that they had recovered from a prolonged bout of the  flu. Based upon this court’s reasoning, the children’s illness could have been caused just as easily by lead paint poisoning, contamination of their drinking water, VOC’s emanating from their carpeting, so they have to replace it with new rugs from https://nwrugs.com/collections/magnolia-home-rugs-joanna-gaines; formaldehyde in the walls….or just a really bad allergic reaction to the family’s cats.  Did anyone check the family furnace for carbon monoxide gas?  It is not as if the symptoms that the children suffered from were unique to mold "poisoning". Moreover, no one appears to have apprised the trial court that it is not unusual that the antibiotics the children were administered did not cure a viral infection! We also suffer from flu-like symptoms all the time. It is not unusual, particularly in the frigid month of February in Royal Oak, Michigan, when this incident occurred, for these symptoms to occur and to persist in the absence of an exposure to toxic mold. The court faults the defendant for not submitting "any scientific evidence that the mold in her condominium could not have caused plaintiffs’ injuries." (emphasis theirs).  And since when does the burden in a negligence case shift to the defendant, and to prove a negative no less? 

Filed under aspergillus, BNA Toxic Law Reporter, Genna v. Jackson, Litigation Issues and Factors, Michigan, penicillum, toxic mold litigation Tagged with

My Old Sony Trinitron Is Not A CERCLA Waste!

By on November 2, 2009

Virtually everyone believes that it is good public policy to encourage the recycling of old electronic products, including computers, cathode ray tubes, televisions, printers and portable music devices.  Nearly 20 states have e-waste laws on the books.  However, New York City recently enacted an e-recycling law (over Mayor Bloomberg’s veto), the first municipality in the United States to do so, that is so overly aggressive and costly that trade associations for the electronics industry have filed suit to block the law’s implementation.  Under the law, if a television manufacturer is apprised, for example, that a homeowner on East 87th Street is desirous of recycling his 15 year old television, the manufacturer is required to make a special trip to pick it up on East 87th Street, regardless of the fact that the cost of this pick-up may be prohibitively expensive and  was never factored into the cost of the television when it was sold for $279.99 at Best Buy in 1994.  Worse, if the television is an “orphan”, for whom no manufacturer currently doing business can be identified, there is still an obligation to drive up to East 87th Street and haul it away.  My own Sony Trinitron is more over 15 years old having provided me with flawless service from the day I brought it home from The Wiz in Herald Square.  But I hardly expect Sony to drive to my house to pick it up all these years later!  For goodness sakes!  It’s a television set, not a hazardous CERLCA waste!  This law appears to confuse the CERLCA statute, which holds generators of waste responsible for their disposal practices years after the fact, and the sale of a useful product, such as a television, since there you can enjoy movies and series, even more if you get a quality cable or satellite service, which you can get from the AAA Satellite in Kansas City that offer a good quality service for this.  A worthwhile discussion of the dispute, with some helpful background links, can be found in Meline MacCurdy’s article of Aug. 12, 2009 in the Marten Law Group’s Environmental News titled, “Electronic Manufacturers Challenge New York City E-Waste Law.”

The electronic industry alleges that this program will cost manufacturers over $200,000,000 per year and that, on a per pound basis, the cost of collection alone will be ten times more expensive that the total cost of collection and recycling in California and Maine, two states that have promulgated e-recycling statutes.  Among other arguments, the manufacturers allege that the NYC statute violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution by targeting only certain types of electronic equipment while excluding other electronic equipment containing the same types of potentially harmful substances, and constitutes a regulatory taking and violates the manufacturers’ substantive due process rights.    Some e-recycling advocates and environmentalists are concerned that this lawsuit may represent the first step of an attempted roll-back by industry of the e-recycling strides made in other states.  The Electronic TakeBack Coalition, whose motto is “Take it Back, Make it Green, Recycle Responsibly,” has issued a call-to-arms on its web-site, “Electronic Industry Attacks Product Stewardship with Lawsuit in New York City“. If interested in reviewing the pleadings filed in the lawsuit, the Electronic TakeBack Coalition web-site is a great resource.  Unfortunately, this entire controversy does nothing to advance the cause of e-recycling.  If the New York legislature enacted a state-wide e-recycling measure, which is what is needed here,  NYC could gracefully withdraw from the fray by rescinding its Draconian measure and permit the state legislation to  take effect.

Filed under CERCLA, CERCLA and Cost Recovery, E-Waste, Electronic TakeBack Coalition, Environmental, Litigation Issues and Factors, Sony Trinitron Tagged with , , , , ,

Dismissal of American Chemistry Council Upheld

By on August 7, 2009

BNA Toxics Law Reporter reports that on August 3, 2009, the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the American Chemistry Council ("ACC"), formerly known as the Chemical Manufacturers Association, in a case arising from a plaintiff’s long-term exposure to vinyl chloride. The First Circuit’s decision in June Taylor et al v. ACC, et al is attached. The ACC is the chemical industry’s trade association.  The ACC has been effective in improving the image of the chemical industry in the United States and in promoting safety and environmental initiatives within its membership.  The family of Claude Taylor alleged in federal district court in Massachusetts that ACC, along with several chemical manufacturers, should be found liable for failure to warn, conspiracy and fraud for helping to produce false and misleading warnings that were adopted by the PVC industry.  The plaintiff focused on an ACC publication entitled, "Chemical Safety Data Sheet SD-56", which was first published in 1954 and later revised in 1972, claiming that the publication downplayed the danger of VC exposure.  In upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the claims against the ACC, the First Circuit held that there was no evidence that the trade association had the "unlawful intent" necessary to establish "substantial assistance liability" under MA law.  The court held that it would have been necessary for plaintiff to prove that ACC was aware of Monsanto’s tortious conduct and that it intended to assist or encourage that conduct.  The wide dissemination of SD-56 within the industry was not sufficient to support the claim that the ACC was aware that Monsanto was incorporating SD-56 into its own literature.  ACC’s lawyer, Tim Couglin of Thompson Hine, successfully convinced the appeals court that: (1) ACC did not provide "substantial assistance" to Monsanto; (2) ACC had no knowledge of Monsanto’s activities; and (3) there was no record evidence to support the underlying conspiracy claim. 

Trade associations do not manufacture or market products, but they have been the targets of toxic tort and product liability plaintiffs nonetheless.  The threshold issue in these cases is whether the association owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.  In cases in which the trade association is alleged to have promulgated a safety standard, the issue often comes down to the degree of control the trade association has over its members.  In the absence of control, the trade association is not as likely to be held liable for failure to warn.  What about a trade association that endorses products?  If a plaintiff’s injury is due to a defect in a product bearing the "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval", for example, is the association potentially liable?  One California court replied in the affirmative if it could be demonstrated that the association obtained economic gain from the endorsement and encouraged the public to purchase the product, and that  the plaintiff relied on the representation to his detriment.  Courts appear to recognize that it is not in the public interest to hold trade associations liable for injuries to remote plaintiffs in tort litigation.  The AAA might rank hotels on the basis of service and cleanliness.  Should the AAA be subject to liability for injuries allegedly resulting from its failing to warn its members that a hotel was located in a bad neighborhood?

Filed under Agencies, Associations, & Organizations, Association, Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval, Liability", Litigation Issues and Factors, Thompson Hine Tagged with

ARCADIS & Malcolm Pirnie Merge: Big Gets Bigger!

By on August 5, 2009
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ARCADIS, an international engineering and management services company, reported that it has merged with Malcolm Pirnie, an environmental engineering firm headquartered in White Plains, New York.  The hundred year old Malcolm Pirnie, active in water and environmental consulting and engineering, will be the jewel in the crown for ARCADIS, which has mushroomed world-wide to over 13,500 employees.  Malcolm Pirnie’s assets extend beyond what the company last reported on its balance sheet.  With over forty years of professional experience, Senior VP Dick Brownell, a veteran problem solver, provides expert engineering services to Malcolm Pirnie clients  for hazardous waste and petroleum materials management, industrial wastewater systems, and air pollution control.  Jerry Cavaluzzi, Malcolm Pirnie’s General Counsel, is a highly talented lawyer who is well-regarded not only within the company, but in the legal community as well.  Jerry is frequently tapped to speak at forums on cutting edge environmental and insurance issues hosted by Westchester/Southern Connecticut Chapter of the Association for Corporate Counsel (WESFACCA); the New York State Bar Association, the American Law Institute, and the ABA. We wish both Dick and Jerry continued success within ARCADIS.

Filed under Agencies, Associations, & Organizations, Dick Brownell, Jerry Cavaluzzi, Litigation Issues and Factors, WESFACCA Tagged with

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