Value Assurance and Diminution of Property Value Claims

By on November 18, 2008

People living near manufacturing plants increasingly seek judicial solutions to environmental issues.  In the wake of an environmental incident (such as a release of contaminants into the air or groundwater), fear and suspicion hinder constructive dialog and problem solving by manufacturers and their communities.  Environmental issues, as much as any other corporate concern, tend to have a ripple effect, often causing repercussions with far-reaching impact on company business.  An accidental release may result in adverse public relations, worker safety disputes, boycott of company products in the market place, adverse regulatory consequences and bad feeling in the community.  How a company responds to media attention at the outset has an important effect on how the community, including elected officials, health authorities, regulatory agencies and prospective jurors, react to the issues presented.  Accordingly, a company must plan in advance how it will respond to an environmental crisis and what steps it will take to minimize the fallout from such a crisis. 

A Value Assurance Plan should be considered as one significant component of a corporate response to homeowner concerns over property values.  A Value Assurance Plan, sometimes referred to as a "VAP", is a contractual promise to assure  homeowners that the equity in their homes will be protected if they sell their homes and realize less than full value from the sale due to an environmental concern in the community.  A VAP promises to compensate those homeowners who sell (or have sold) their homes by paying them the difference between the property’s sale price and its fair market value prior to the discovery of possible contamination.  As part of the arrangement, the company may also offer to reimburse the closing costs and the moving expenses of residents who leave the community.  Often, the reassurance that a VAP provides is successful in preventing the panic selling (the rush to the door) that often strikes communities shortly after public disclosure of an environmental problem. 

To implement a Value Assurance Plan, a company needs  creative lawyering and a consultant who has a strong understanding of the economic dynamics driving the property diminution claims and who can accurately assess the potential exposure to the company of taking alternative courses of action, including taking no action at all.  Two such high qualified consultants are Jerry Dent  at Alvarez & Marsal in Birmingham, Alabama, and  Dwight Duncan at EconLit in Phoenix, Arizona. 

Filed under Alvarez & Marsal, contamination, Diminution of Property Value, Dwight Duncan, EconLit, environmental release, Jerry Dent, Value Assurance Plan, VAP Tagged with

Should Brand Name Manufacturers Be Accountable For Side Effects Caused By Generics?

By on November 11, 2008

 

How can a brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer owe a duty to patients who take only a generic version of its product? In a case of first impression in California, a state appellate court held on November 7, 2008 that Wyeth, Inc. owed a duty to plaintiff Elizabeth Conte, who developed a serious and irreversible neurological condition as a result of taking metoclopramide, the generic version of Wyeth’s Reglan, which is used to treat gastroesophageal reflux disease. In so holding, the California appellate court declined to follow the holdings of a majority of courts that have grappled with this issue.

In Elizabeth Ann Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. et al., the Court of Appeal of the State of the California in the First Appellate District in San Francisco, held that a brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer’s common law duty to use due care when providing product warnings extends not only to consumers of its own product, but also to those patients whose doctors foreseeably rely on the name-brand manufacturer’s product information in prescribing a medication, even if the prescription is filled with the generic version of the drug. In reversing summary judgment granted to Wyeth by the trial court, the appellate court accepted Conte’s argument that Wyeth should be liable for her injuries because a brand-name manufacturer that disseminates information about its product owes a duty of care to ensure the information’s accuracy to all physicians who prescribe the drug in reasonable reliance on that information, even if the patient ends up taking the product’s generic equivalent.

The court agreed with Wyeth that Conte could not pursue a strict products liability claim against Wyeth. Indeed, Conte did not allege that Wyeth was strictly liability due to inadequate warnings. Rather, she claimed that Wyeth failed to exercise due care in disseminating its product information to physicians.  The court rejected Wyeth’s contention that Conte’s case was merely a product liability suit masquerading as a negligence case. The court held that the plaintiff could pursue claims of intentional and/or negligent misrepresentation based upon Wyeth’s labeling information about the safety of metoclopramide, the risks of its long term use, and the likelihood of serious side effects. 

Was the court correct in determining that Wyeth owed the plaintiff a duty in a negligence context where no such duty could be found to exist in a strict liability case? As a matter of public policy, should a brand-name drug manufacturer be subjected to what Wyeth argued might be “permanent and uncontrolled liability” in perpetuity. Even as a brand-name manufacturer’s sales decrease over time, its potential product liability exposure may actually increase because of higher market share won by generic competitors. Ironically, the generic manufacturer takes precious market share from the brand-name manufacturer at the same time that the court shifts the generic’s product liability exposure back to the pioneer. 

We believe that the better reasoned analysis of this issue may be found in Foster v. American Home Products Corp. (4th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d. 165 (2003), in which the Fourth Circuit held that a manufacturer of a name-brand drug could not be held liable under a theory of negligent representation for an injury arising from the ingestion of a generic version of the drug. Taken to its logical extreme, in the brave new world envisioned by the Conte court, it may not matter that a plaintiff cannot identify the manufacturer of a product that caused an alleged injury so long as the plaintiff can plausibly claim to have relied on some other manufacturer’s operator’s manual.

Filed under American Home Products, brand-name manufacturer, Conte, Elizabeth Ann Conte, generic, metoclopramide, Negligent Misrepresentation, Pharmaceutical & Medical Device, Reglan, Strict Liability, Wyeth Tagged with

CPSC’s New Database: An Opportunity for Abuse?

By on October 31, 2008

The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (“CPSIA”) provides that the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) will establish and maintain an Internet database on the safety of consumer products.  The CPSIA Section 212 requires that the database be: (1) available to the public; (2)  searchable; and (3) accessible on the CPSC’s website.  Reports of harm caused by consumer products may be reported by consumers; local, state or federal govenment agencies; health care professionals; child service providers; and public safety entities. Ideally, the database will encourage the sharing of information and direct communications among consumers, consumer advocacy groups and state attorneys general, who have been given an important new role under the CPSIA.  For the first time, consumers will have direct instant access on the Agency’s website to potentially important product safety information.

The CPSIA of 2008 is much needed legislation to upgrade the level of  protection provided to the American consumer by the federal government.  The law represents the Congress’ response to a year of multiple, embarrassing consumer product scandal after another during what some commentators have termed the “Year of the Recall”.  In the past, information vital to the public welfare concerning defective consumer products has not been promptly provided to the American people.  At times, this delay may have been responsible for what may have been preventable injuries or deaths —  hence, the legislative mandate for the database.

In light of these public benefits, can there be any dark side to this new era of governmental transparency?  Are consumer product companies justified in fearing that the database has the potential to  spread disinformation and unfairly tarnish reputations?

The statute requires that a report submitted for inclusion on the database: (1) describe the consumer product; (2) identify the manufacturer or private labeler; (3) describe the harm related to the use of the product; (4) provide contact information; and (5) contain a verification that the report is true and accurate. Based upon informal Commission staffer comments, the CPSC is not required to perform an independent investigation to determine the veracity of a report or whether the incident that is the subject of the report occurred in the manner claimed or occurred at all.  For this reason, there is a risk that the database may morph into a  consumer Wikipedia, but with the imprimatur of United States approval and the gloss that comes from being hosted on a federal regulatory agency website.  What opportunity will  manufacturers have to comment on a report that one of their products may have triggered a fire in a home or caused a child to suffocate before the report is posted?  Unfortunately, not a whole lot!  The statute requires that within five days of receiving a report the Commission shall “to the extent practicable” transmit the report to the manufacturer identified in the report prior to the report being posted on the database.   Because the person making the report need not be identified to the manufacturer unless he or she explicitly consents, there may not be much the manufacturer can do, within the 10 day window provided before the report is posted, to determine whether the report is accurate. Certainly, this narrow window does not permit a manufacturer to obtain the product from a consumer, assuming the consumer can be identified, and inspect it.  The manufacturer can request that proprietary or trade secret information not be posted on the database, but that request, if granted, will result only in the sensitive information being redacted, not in a delay in posting the report on the database.  The statute permits a manufacturer to request that its own comments also be included in the database, but in the absence of a realistic time frame to perform an investigation of the underlying report, what would be an appropriate comment to make?  Moreover, the manufacturer may be at a disadvantage if reporters call seeking comment after the consumer’s report is posted by the Commission.

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Filed under clear and conspicuous notice, CPSC database, CPSIA, evidence, Product Manufacturers, product recalls, Toxic Tort/Product Liability Litigation, year of the recall Tagged with

When Is A Cleanup “Voluntary” Under CERCLA?

By on October 17, 2008

 Nothing in §107(a)(4)(B) references “voluntary” cleanups, and nothing in that section restricts its application to “voluntary” cleanups or actors. Sections 107(a) and 113(f) of CERCLA allow private parties to recover expenses associated with cleaning up contaminated sites. Similarly, nothing in Atlantic Research and its progeny restricts the application of cost recovery actions under CERCLA §107(a)(4)(B) to “voluntary” cleanups.  If that is the case, what is the basis for the contention that only PRPs that perform cleanups voluntarily are entitled to pursue §107 cost recovery claims?

Section 107(a) defines four categories of PRPs and makes them liable for, among other things, “(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan” and “(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with [such] plan,” §§107(a)(4)(A)-(B). This is the language on which the Supreme Court relied in its decision in Atlantic Research.Similarly,  Atlantic Research is best understood in the context of the development of the law of recovery of CERCLA response costs. Historically, some courts interpreted §107(a)(4)(B) as providing a cause of action for a private party to recover voluntarily incurred response costs and to seek contribution after having been sued. However, after the enactment of §113(f), which authorizes one PRP to sue another for contribution, many courts held §113(f) to be the exclusive remedy for PRPs. In Cooper Industries, Inc.,  the Supreme Court demonstrated the limitations of §113, and held that a private party could seek contribution under §113(f) only after being sued under §§106 or 107(a).  In Atlantic Research, the Supreme Court held that §107(a)(4)(B)’s plain language allows a PRP to recover costs from other PRPs, providing a cost recovery remedy to PRPs that had not been sued under §§106 or 107(a).

The Atlantic Research decision uses the term “voluntary” at times, but does not define the term or use it literally.  After all, only parties that do not have liability under CERCLA or other regulatory schemes truly engage in “voluntary” response actions. Rather, in Atlantic Research and its progeny the term “voluntary” is simply used to draw a contrast with private parties who have been sued under CERCLA §§106 or 107(a) and, therefore, pursuant to Cooper Industries, qualify to seek contribution from other liable parties under CERCLA §113.  Despite the Court’s use of the terms “voluntary” and “involuntary” to distinguish between payments recoverable under §107(a) and those recoverable under §113(f), the operative principle appears to be that §107(a) is available to recover payments only in cases where §113(f) is not. This is what a federal district trial court concluded recently in Appleton Papers Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., No. 08-C-16, 2008 WL 3891304 (E.D.Wis. Aug. 20, 2008).  In E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 508 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2007), the Third Circuit distinguished between “those who voluntarily admitted their responsibility” and those who have “in fact been held responsible (via adjudication or settlement with the EPA)” in discussing who may bring an action under CERCLA §107(f). Id at 133. Therefore, a PRP who conducts a dialog with a regulatory agency concerning how best to clean up a site does not make the PRP who admits liability and accepts responsibility any less a volunteer under CERCLA and applicable case law. In Champion Laboratories, Inc. v. Metex Corp., No. 02-5284, 2008 WL 1808309 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2008), the Hon. William H. Walls held that a plaintiff undergoing an ISRA  cleanup in New Jersey could pursue a CERCLA §107 claim.. The New Jersey district court clearly  did not find the pendency of an ISRA cleanup any impediment to plaintiff’s pursuit of a CERCLA §107 claim. The whole point of the Atlantic Research decision is that PRPs may, without regard to their own disposal activity, avail themselves of CERCLA §107.

Nothing in CERCLA §107(a)(4)(B) or any decision post-Atlantic Research conditions a party’s eligibility to bring a cost recovery action under CERCLA §107(a)(4)(B) on that party’s response action having been purely voluntary. Any other interpretation of “voluntariness” under CERCLA, if adopted, would have the anomalous result of barring the doors of the courthouse to CERCLA plaintiffs who cannot bring a CERCLA §113 claim (having not been the prior subject of a §106 or §107 claim by the United States), but whose cleanup may not have been “voluntary” in the strictest sense. It was clearly not the intention of Atlantic Research to limit access to the courthouse to only a restricted sub-class of CERCLA §107 plaintiffs.

 

Filed under Aviall, CERCLA and Cost Recovery, cleanup, Cooper Industries, Supreme Court, Voluntariness, voluntary Tagged with

A New Era For Private Cost Recovery Litigation?

By on October 16, 2008

In its precedent breaking decision in United States v. Atlantic Research Corporation, decided in June 2007,  the United States Supreme Court held that the plain language of CERCLA  §107(a)(4)(B) authorizes any private party, including PRPs, to commence an environmental cost recovery action.  The Supreme Court added as dictum that it  “assume[d] without deciding”  that §107(a) provided these PRP plaintiffs with the right to pursue a claim for joint and several liability.   CERCLA  §107 is a strict liability scheme that permits a plaintiff to seek joint and several liability without the burden of proving causation.  Prior to Atlantic Research, only the United States or an “innocent landowner” could wield §107’s heavy club.  In the wake of Atlantic Research, any PRP (i.e. polluter) can bring a §107 claim against other PRPs to recover costs.  The only exception is that PRPs who have been defendants in actions brought against them by the United States pursuant to CERCLA  §106 or  §107 must pursue their recovery pursuant to §113, which only permits the recovery of costs on a pro rata basis via contribution.  To those unlucky plaintiffs, §107 is not available.

Are we at the dawn of a new era of private cost recovery litigation?  In traditional §113 actions, the PRP plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that neither plaintiff nor third parties bear any percentage allocation of responsibility for the cleanup costs at issue.  If this burden now passes from the plaintiff to defendants, defendants may be disinclined to run the risk of being held jointly and severally liable for all of a site’s cleanup costs in the event that their proof falls short.  This risk factor should make defendants more willing to come to the bargaining table earlier.  The same risk consideration should motivate corporate PRP plaintiffs to file §107 suits rather than to let grass grow under their feet.

In weighing possible unfairness to §107 defendants, the Supreme Court noted that  a defendant PRP in  a §107 suit could blunt any inequitable distribution of costs by filing a §113(f) counter-claim.  Thus, once CERCLA liability is established, defendants may avoid joint and several liability by establishing that they caused only a divisible portion of harm. Of course, this course of action is easier said than done and requires a significant commitment of legal manpower to see through to the end.  One court recognized that by providing a RPP with an opportunity to pursue joint and several liability against other PRPs, §107 further encourages a PRP to quickly and voluntarily cleanup a site in the hopes that it might recover its response costs from other PRPs. Raytheon Aircraft Company v. United States, 532 F.Supp. 2d 1306, 1310 (holding that the Court’s decision to permit plaintiff-PRP to pursue joint and several liability under §107(a) found support in Atlantic Research).  In my judgment, the environmental bar should expect that a large number of cost recovery cases will be filed over the next 12 months.

Filed under Atlantic, CERCLA and Cost Recovery, cost, Environmental, Litigation, recovery, Research Tagged with , ,

E-Discovery and New Federal Rule of Evidence 502

By on October 1, 2008

 On September 19, 2008, President Bush signed S. 2450 into law and new Evidence Rule 502  was added to the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The new rule provides for protections against waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity. The practical effect of the new legislation should be to reduce the often staggering legal costs corporations often incur in complex litigation, particularly in producing electronic discovery.  In drafting the legislation, the Advisory Committee of Evidence Rules recognized that lawyers spend significant time and effort preserving the attorney-client privilege and work product.  Under the prior rule, if a protected document was produced, even accidentally, there was a risk that a court would find a subject matter waiver that would apply, not only to the instant case and document, but to other cases and documents as well.  Thus, lawyers placed an enormous amount of effort (and expense) into pre-disclosure document review to protect against inadvertent disclosure.  Although waiver issues always have been a concern in document-intensive litigation (and will no doubt continue to be in the future), the increased discovery burden created by e-discovery brought this issue to the boiling point over the past two years.  Under the new rule, the jeopardy to corporations (and their law firms for permitting a waiver) is substantially mitigated.

The new rule does not address the scope of the attorney-client privilege or work product protection.  Rather, the new rule covers issues of scope of waiver, inadvertent disclosure, and the controlling effect of court orders and agreements.

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Filed under Confidentiality, E-Discovery, FRE 502, Privilege, waiver Tagged with

“Greenwashing” and the Rise of Deceptive Trade Practice/False Advertising Class Action Claims

By on September 26, 2008

Greenwashing” involves misleading consumers concerning the environmental benefits of a product or service. In the “Six Sins of Greenwashing,” TerraChoice a marketing firm, studied over one thousand consumer products and concluded that all but one made claims that were demonstrably false or misled consumers. TerraChoice found that eco-marketers were guilty of what it described as the “Six Sins of Greenwashing,” which include:

  1. Sin of the Hidden Tradeoff
  2. Sin of No Proof
  3. Sin of Vagueness
  4. Sin of Irrelevance
  5. Sin of Fibbing
  6. Sin of the Lesser of Two Evils

Are companies that mislead well-intentioned customers into making purchases that do not deliver their promise subjecting themselves to class action claims alleging deceptive trade practice and false advertising? More than ever before, sellers of consumer goods are committing the “Sin of Vagueness” (for example) by claiming that their products are “chemical free,” “non-toxic,” “all natural,” or “environmentally friendly.” If a purchaser is induced to purchase a pesticide product because it claimed in advertising to be “chemical free” or “non-toxic,” and becomes ill, would a product liability claim be less difficult to prosecute?  More significantly, will the “Six Sins of Greenwashing” give rise to false advertising and deceptive trade practice class action suits?  In the absence of regulation concerning eco-marketing, what standard will courts hold consumer product sellers to in evaluating these claims. In general, product sellers can obtain guidance from:  (1) standards established by multiple private certification groups; (2) “Green Guides” issued by the United States Federal Trade Commission; and (3) ISO 14021 and ISO 14024, which provide standards on how best to communicate environmental product information. Voluntary adherence to any of these standards or guidelines will certainly not preempt a class action, but may provide credible defenses to these claims.

Filed under Deceptive And Unfair Trade Practices, Deceptive Trade Practices, Greenwashing Tagged with

Is Electricity a “Product”?

By on September 3, 2008

Whether electricity supplied to a homeowner by the local electric utility  is viewed as a “product” or a “service” may have significant ramifications in litigation.  If providing electricity constitutes a “product”, injured plaintiffs can seek recovery under a theory of strict liability.  If it is not a product, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate the electric utility failed to use reasonable care.  In a recent Connecticut case, Travelers Indemnity Company of America v. Connecticut Light & Power Co, Hartford J.D. at Harford (Docket No. CV-07-5012441-S ) 2008 WL 2447351 (Conn. Super.), the trial court  held that once electricity entered the homeowner’s residence, it constituted a “product” rather than a “service” and that plaintiff could  proceed under the Connecticut Product Liability Act (“CPLA”).   In the case, a fire allegedly caused by voltage fluctuations broke out in the home of Travelers’ insureds, Linda and Michael Murphy, resulting in property damage.  Apparently,  the Murphy’s had complained to CL&P earlier about the voltage fluctuations and had been assured that the problem had been addressed.  After paying the claim,

Connecticut courts are split concerning whether electricity can be classified as a product such that a claim could be brought under the CPLA..  However, the court in Travelers relied upon what appears to be an emerging majority view nationally.  In a 1985 California appellate decision, Pierce v. PG&E, the court opined that policy justifications warranted the imposition of strict liability: (1)  difficulty of proving negligence involving a vast and complex electrical power system; (2) economic incentive for improved product safety; (3) to encourage reallocation of resources toward safer products; and (4) to spread the risk of loss among all who use the product.  What judicial limitations may be reasonable to prevent increased access to strict liability in tort for toxic tort plaintiffs injured by electricity? One bright line test might be permit electricity to be viewed as a product only when the electricity has been transferred to the consumer in a usable voltage.  Only then could a court reasonably view electricity as a consumer product.  Under this test, exposure to high voltage transmission lines would not result in a strict liability lawsuit, but you still want to make sure you cut the electricity bills down by switching to a provider that offers energy-saving options, such as those present in the Reliant Energy plans.

Filed under Public Utilities, Strict Liability, Toxic Tort/Product Liability Litigation

Lead Pigments in Paint and Public Nuisance Law

By on July 14, 2008

Lost in the learned treatises written in the wake of the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision in State of Rhode Island v. Lead Industries Association, Inc.  (July 1, 2008),  which properly held that manufacturers of lead pigment are not liable under a nuisance theory for the harm caused by the use of lead paint, is discussion of the significant loss of market capitalization and shareholder value to Sherwin Williams and other manufacturer defendants who have been defending these nuisance claims for the past several years.  Apparently, there is no mechanism in Rhode Island for a defendant to file an interlocutory appeal to challenge a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss a complaint as a matter of law.  Had an interlocutory appeal been available to the lead pigment manufacturers, there is no doubt that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would have ended years ago the State Attorney General’s misguided crusade to have the defendants pay billions of dollars to remediate lead contamination in an estimated 240,000 houses  and apartments, 12,969 seasonal housing units, 419 child care centers and 339 elementary schools.  Notions of basic fairness suggest that a defendant facing a potential liability of this magnitude should be able to obtain appellate review of the plaintiff’s right to proceed before having to incur the cost and uncertainty of a court trial.  A defendant with less resources than the lead pigment manufacturers might have been forced into a premature settlement with the State or even sought bankruptcy protection prior to waiting out the lengthy appeals process.

Filed under Agencies, Associations, & Organizations, attorney general, Lead, lead pigment, Legal, Litigation Issues and Factors, Nuisance, Rhode Island, Sherwin Willliams Tagged with

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