ESI In New York State Court Practice

By on January 19, 2010

Are defendants in New York product liability and toxic tort litigation better off in federal court than in state court? Federal court discovery rules certainly are more liberal than state court discovery rules. There, plaintiff’s experts are subject to deposition and, if appropriate, Daubert challenges. In contrast, state court provides only minimal expert disclosure. However, state court rules concerning the production of electronically stored information (“ESI”) may be more favorable to corporate defendants litigating in state court. In state court, the general rule is that the requesting party pays for the defendant’s ESI retrieval. In federal court, the court will apply “proportionality” concepts, and balance the importance of the discovery with the burden on the producing party. Thus, the result of the burden shifting analysis is somewhat more complex and subject to more variables. As reported in this space on November 4, 2009, (“Cost Allocation of E-Discovery in NY Trial Courts”), the Joint Committee on Electronic Discovery, convened by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, has recommended that the legislature amend the CPLR to address time-consuming ESI disclosure disputes. The new proposed CPLR rule is expected to address a litigant’s duty to preserve ESI in anticipation of litigation; the scope of that duty; and the scope of ESI production. 

An article in Kramer Levin’s Electronic Discovery Update (January 2010), “Cost Shifting in New York: Forum Makes All the Difference,” discusses the background of the general presumption in state court that the requesting party pays for the cost of discovery. Although the CPLR does not explicitly apply this presumption to ESI costs, New York state courts have followed this presumption when deciding how to allocate e-discovery costs. In Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consult. Corp., for example, the court found that “… cost shifting of electronic discovery is not an issue in New York, since the courts have held that, under the CPLR, the party seeking discovery should incur the costs.” Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consult. Corp., 4 Misc.3d 1019(A), 2004 WL 1949062 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. Aug 18, 2004). In contrast to state court practice, the standard under federal jurisprudence is less clear cut.  The Hon. Shira Scheindlin (SDNY) has articulated a multi-factored balancing test, which has been influential in guiding determinations of when the cost of producing “inaccessible” data should be shifted to the requesting party. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Kramer Levin Update observes that a recent New York trial court opinion declined to apply this federal approach, stating that it was “not empowered – by statute or case law – to overturn the well settled rule in New York state that the party seeking discovery bear the cost incurred in its production.” T.A. Ahern Contractors Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y., 2009 WL 806779 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Mar. 19, 2009). Citing the policy behind the rule, the court observed that the requester-pays standard gives a party “a strong incentive to formulate its discovery requests in a manner as minimally burdensome as possible.”  I predict that the differences between state and federal ESI practice will narrow in the near term, possibly with the promulgation of a CPLR rule, and that New York will ultimately adopt a more federal approach modeled on the influential Sedona Conference Working Group template.  However, for the present, a New York state court plaintiff runs the risk of incurring substantial costs in demanding burdensome ESI from a corporate defendant.  Be careful what you wish for!

 

Filed under Bar of the City of New York, CPLR, E-Discovery, Electronic Discovery, Electronically Stored Information, Kramer Levin, proportionality, sedona, Zubulake Tagged with

Is DEC Ill-Equipped to Oversee Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Drilling?

By on January 15, 2010

According to a report issued by Cornell Law School, the State of New York’s blueprint for Marcellus Shale development proposes 187 new regulatory activities necessary for the oversight of natural gas drilling, but the blueprint does not explain how DEC will carry out these activities.  Cornell’s report concludes that DEC does not have the manpower to appropriately regulate economic development in the Marcellus Shale Formation. According to Adjunct Professor Keith Porter at Cornell Law School, “There is no way they [DEC’s Division of Mineral Resources] have enough people to visit the sites to make sure conditions are met.”  The Cornell study notes that DEC’s proposals require firsthand inspections and the development of detailed spill prevention plans on a site-by-site basis. The proposals also involve assessing and monitoring water resources to ensure they are not damaged by the gas industry’s need for huge volumes of fresh water to stimulate gas production in the fracking process. This process involves shooting millions of gallons of chemical solutions into each well, which then regurgitate brine and wastewater with chemicals, heavy metals and naturally occurring radioactivity. For their part, industry proponents point to New York’s strict regulations and a strong track record by industry. Environmental advocates challenge industry claims, pointing to hundreds of incidents and complaints involving natural gas and oil drilling buried in the DEC’s hazardous spills database. However,  it was reported on January 11, 1010 that DEC Commissioner Pete Grannis had asserted in a letter to Assemblyman William Parment, a member of the legislature’s Environmental Conservation Committee, that reports of accidents relating to natural gas drilling in New York have been overblown and taken out of context.  Without additional DEC inspectors, says Professor Porter, Marcellus Development “will rely on self-compliance.” Environmental advocates point to the water contamination and regulatory violations that plagued the operations of Cabot Oil & Gas in Dimock, Pennsylvania as an object lesson. The Cornell study summarizes the proposed regulatory obligations DEC sets forth in the draft Supplemental Generic which include, among other things,  protecting water resources such as New York’s portion of the Great Lakes Basin;  reviewing permits for equipment and structures that might disturb surface water bodies such as rivers and streams or potentially impact aquatic wetland and terrestrial habitats and water quality;  impacts to wetlands; aquifer depletion arising from proposed groundwater withdrawals for high-volume hydraulic fracturing; reviewing major water withdrawals and approved diversions in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin under the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Water Resources Compact; comprehensive storm water pollution prevention plans and review of permits to address storm water runoff and storm water discharges; industrial activities, including addressing potential sources of pollution and determining when drilling and hydraulic fracturing operations are completed; surface spills and releases at the Well Pad; drilling rig, fuel and tank refueling activities; groundwater impacts associated with well drilling and construction;  private water well testing;  infrastructure control from waste transport to road spreading; and, not least, protecting New York City’s subsurface water supply infrastructure. The import  of the Cornell Law School study is that New York can build an elaborate regulatory scheme designed to protect the environment, but unless there are enough of the right people to enforce the regulations and ensure that they are being rigorously adhered to, the regulations do not amount to much. 

Filed under Cornell, DEC, DEC Commissioner Pete Grannis, Fracking, Law, Marcellus Formation, Marcellus Shale, Marcellus Shale Formation, NYC Department of Environmental Protection, Oil & Gas, Pete Grannis, School" Tagged with

Environmental & Economic Interests Clash Over Marcellus Shale

By on January 15, 2010

Environmental groups and proponents of economic development and natural gas exploration are on a collision course of competing economic and environmental interests involving an enormous untapped reservoir of natural gas in the Marcellus Shale Formation. That the Marcellus Shale Formation lies in part across economically depressed regions in upstate New York and Pennsylvania, in urgent need of  an economic boost,  only adds fuel to the dispute. At the heart of the controversy lies the New York City watershed, pristine waters in upstate New York  counties that provide the drinking water for millions of people in New York City. The Marcellus Shale Formation sits underground and stretches southwest from New York through Pennsylvania, and into West Virginia and Ohio. According to experts at Penn State University, the Marcellus Shale Formation is the largest known shale deposit in the world. Recently developed extraction techniques in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing are expected to provide an additional boost to the productivity of Marcellus gas wells. Terry Englander, a geoscience professor at Penn State University, estimates that recoverable reserves in Marcellus Shale could be as high as 489 trillion cubic feet! The Draft 2009 New York State Energy Plan recognizes the great potential benefit to New York from development of the Marcellus Shale natural gas resource. But what environmental safeguards should accompany this monumental enterprise?

On December 23, 2009, the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) (not to be confused with theNew York State Department of Environmental Conservation or "DEC"),  called for a prohibition on natural gas drilling in the New York City watershed, urging that, “[N]natural gas drilling and exploration are incompatible with the operation of New York State’s unfiltered water supply system and pose unacceptable risks for more than nine million New Yorkers in this City and State.” According to DEP’s Final Impact Assessment Report, drilling in the watershed requires invasive industrialization and would create a substantial risk of chemical contamination and infrastructure damage. In particular, the DEP’s report singled out the high-volume hydrofracking and horizontal drilling as posing significant environmental risks. Clearly, measures will be taken to protect the watershed, but the devil will be in the details.  A Congressional Research Service report, released on September 9, 2009, examines gas drilling in the Marcellus Shale region.  The report acknowledges that groundwater contamination from improper drilling and casing is a risk.  Water sources in New York listed as "primary" or "principal" aquifers may be at risk, according to the report, due to the permeable "unconsolidated sand and gravel deposits" in northern Pennsylvania and southern New York because of short distances from the land surface to the water table. 



 

Filed under Marcellus Formation, Marcellus Shale, Marcellus Shale Formation, natural gas exploration, New York City watershed, NYC Department of Environmental Protection, Oil & Gas, Penn State University, Terry Englander Tagged with

A Primer On New York Product Liability Law

By on January 14, 2010

Michael Hoenig’s Product Liability column in The New York Law Journal, “Complexities Abound In Product Design Claims” (January 11, 2010), provides an excellent primer  on the law of product liability in New York state and a good discussion of the leading cases. (NYLJ.com requires a subscription to access. If you cannot download the article, Mr. Hoenig  will post the article within a couple of weeks on his law firm’s web site).   Mr. Hoenig devotes the body of his article to a recent Appellate Division, First Department decision, Chow v. Reckitt & Colman Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 00013 (App. Div., 1st Dept., Jan. 5, 2010).  There, a split First Department upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant manufacturer of of a drain cleaner called "Lewis Red Devil Lye", which blinded the plaintiff during an attempt to unclog a floor drain in the kitchen of the restaurant where he worked.  Applying the Court of Appeals standard in Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co, the court examined the ‘risk-utility balancing’ calculus, which often lies at the heart of a defective design product liability inquiry. In addition to Mr. Hoenig’s “refresher” survey of the law of product design liability, he directs his readers to the commentary issued by the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions of the Association of Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, particularly PJI 2:120. For further reading, a thoughtful discussion of PJI 2:120 appears in a 2008 article "New  Design-Defect Jury Instructions: Catching ‘Denny’ " by Stephen R. Blacklocks, a partner in Hunton & Wiliams’  New York office.  As Mr. Hoenig states in the conclusion of NYLJ article, “Mastery of the legal principles – our survey merely scratches the surface – is indispensable in perfecting one’s advocacy.”  When your client next assigns you a new case for  you to defend, take a few minutes to review Mr. Hoenig’s primer to remind yourself just how many hurdles plaintiff’s counsel needs to overcome to make out a prima facie case of design defect. 

Filed under Chow v. Reckitt & Colman Inc, Design Defect, Failure to Warn, Herzfeld & Rubin, Hunton & Williams, Micheal Hoeng, New York Law Journal, New York Pattern Jury Instructions, Stephen R. Blacklocks, Toxic Tort/Product Liability Litigation, Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co Tagged with

No General Causation? No Specific Causation? No Problem!

By on January 8, 2010

BNA Toxics Law Reporter reported on December 31, 2009, that a Michigan Appeals Court affirmed a mold exposure verdict for $303,260, finding that expert testimony was not necessary under Michigan State law to prove either general causation or specific causation.  In Genna v. Jackson, Mich. Ct. App., No. 285746, the Michigan Court Of Appeals (Oakland Circuit Court) affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s post-judgment motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial. Based upon a review of the decision, it is not disputed ( at least by this writer) that defendant’s negligent conduct resulted in substantial  flooding in the plaintiffs’ home and the gross mold contamination that resulted. Plaintiff’s microbial expert identified two molds in the home–penicillum and aspergillus–which he testified at trial could affect human health and pose safety issues.  Plaintiffs’ children began to experience what the court described as "flu-like symptoms including: diarrhea, vomiting, congestion and nosebleeds".  Over a period of months, these symptoms worsened and the symptoms did not respond to aggressive treatment.  Plaintiffs did not call an expert to testify that these symptoms were the result of the mold contamination. Nonetheless, the appeals court held that plaintiff did not have to demonstrate that the alleged toxin is "capable" of causing injuries like those suffered by the children, let alone requiring the plaintiffs to prove that these children’s symptoms were caused by mold exposure. The court reasoned as follows: "This is not a complicated case: the children were removed from the home, the mold was discovered, and the children recovered".  Thus, the court based its decision on "circumstantial evidence that would ‘facilitate reasonable inferences of causation, not mere speculation’."  With due respect to the appellate panel, which was obviously impressed with the graphic description of "patches of mold of all different colors all over the walls and ceilings in her kitchen, family room and dining area", this is a really bad decision and a potentially dangerous precedent in Michigan!  It is a mistake to base toxic tort causation on a temporal relationship,i.e., the "children were removed from the home, the mold was discovered, and children recovered."  Flu-like symptoms can be caused by……well, the flu.  That the children’s symptoms went away could signify that they had recovered from a prolonged bout of the  flu. Based upon this court’s reasoning, the children’s illness could have been caused just as easily by lead paint poisoning, contamination of their drinking water, VOC’s emanating from their carpeting, so they have to replace it with new rugs from https://nwrugs.com/collections/magnolia-home-rugs-joanna-gaines; formaldehyde in the walls….or just a really bad allergic reaction to the family’s cats.  Did anyone check the family furnace for carbon monoxide gas?  It is not as if the symptoms that the children suffered from were unique to mold "poisoning". Moreover, no one appears to have apprised the trial court that it is not unusual that the antibiotics the children were administered did not cure a viral infection! We also suffer from flu-like symptoms all the time. It is not unusual, particularly in the frigid month of February in Royal Oak, Michigan, when this incident occurred, for these symptoms to occur and to persist in the absence of an exposure to toxic mold. The court faults the defendant for not submitting "any scientific evidence that the mold in her condominium could not have caused plaintiffs’ injuries." (emphasis theirs).  And since when does the burden in a negligence case shift to the defendant, and to prove a negative no less? 

Filed under aspergillus, BNA Toxic Law Reporter, Genna v. Jackson, Litigation Issues and Factors, Michigan, penicillum, toxic mold litigation Tagged with

Climate Change Science in the Courtroom

By on December 30, 2009

Two electrifying Circuit Court of Appeals cases handed down in 2009 may set the stage for climate change litigation in the years to come. The decisions are Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., et al., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) and Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, et al., 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). In both cases, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the federal district court and held that the plaintiffs had pleaded adequate facts to permit their cases to proceed. Therefore, unless the United States Supreme Court weighs in and reverses this growing momentum in climate change litigation, it is likely that federal trial courts will be grappling with all of the issues surrounding climate change liability, not least of which will be the science. Did defendant oil and coal producers, chemical companies and coal-using companies bring down the wrath of Hurricane Katrina on the Mississippi plaintiffs? What scientific evidence will be marshaled by plaintiffs to support their allegations? These are the questions that the Comer court will have to grapple with. The very idea that a corporate entity could be found legally responsible for unleashing the catastrophic power of a hurricane would have been unthinkable even ten years ago. Leaving aside epochal issues of public policy, justiciability and theology, the science surrounding climate change litigation will figure prominently in these lawsuits.

An excellent article on scientific issues in climate change litigation, Issues of Proof in Climate Change Litigation, by Francis J. Menton, a partner at Willkie Farr & Gallagher, appeared in The New York Law Journal (12/29/09).  Mr. Menton’s discourse, commencing with the issuance in 2001 of the Third Assessment Report (“TAR”) from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) and bringing us up-to-date, reads like a Dan Brown conspiracy thriller, replete with conflicting claims and allegations of scientific fraud, data distortion, revelations by whistle blowers, and spoliation of evidence. On the one hand, the climate change plaintiffs allege that there exists a “clear scientific consensus that global warming has begun and that most of the current global warming is caused by emissions of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion.” On the other hand, there are those who deny that there is any consensus and that the entire hypothesis of human-caused or “anthropogenic” global warming is an “urban myth.” Undoubtedly, there will be Daubert–driven debates on both general and specific causation in the global warming litigation.

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Filed under Climate Change, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, et al, Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., Francis J. Menton, Global Warming, IPCC, Third Assessment Report Tagged with ,

Expert Reports Ghostwritten By Counsel

By on December 28, 2009

Over the years, I have become an enormous fan of Michael Hoenig, a partner at Herzfeld & Rubin, who writes the Products Liability column in The New York Law Journal. More than any other product liability commentator, Mr. Hoenig has served as a muse and inspiration. His columns are thoughtful and well-written. 

Mr. Hoenig’s column titled, “When Attorneys Ghostwrite Experts’ Reports,” published December 14, 2009, is a case in point. Shortly after the column appeared, I prepared a motion for filing in the EDNY to disqualify an adversary’s expert after he confessed in deposition to not preparing his own expert report. In his article,  Mr. Hoenig poses the following questions: How much attorney involvement in the drafting of experts’ reports is permissible? Must the entire work product be that of the expert? Or, at the other extreme, would it be acceptable for an attorney to draft the entire expert’s report with the expert “adopting” it? And, if at least some lawyer input is tolerable, then what is the boundary line between permission and perdition? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) calls for disclosure of experts retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony and which “must be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness.” Mr. Hoenig discusses the federal district court case law discussing the circumstances under which an expert’s failure to prepare his own report might lead to his being barred from testifying at trial. In evaluating the individual facts presented to determine Rule 26 compliance, courts will most likely base their decisions not on who actually penned the report but, rather, whose opinions and analysis the report contains. One federal district court has held that “substantial participation” by the expert in the preparation of the report is required. Even if your motion to disqualify the expert altogether does not succeed, if you can demonstrate to the trial court that much of the expert’s report was ghostwritten by your adversary, the court may be more kindly disposed to your Daubert arguments. After all, if the expert cannot be bothered to write his own report, how painstaking can his methodology be?

Filed under Daubert, Expert Reports, Federal Court Litigation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), Ghostwriting, Michael Hoenig, New York Law Journal Tagged with

No Interlocutory Appeal To Protect Attorney-Client Privileged Documents

By on December 9, 2009

The United States Supreme Court yesterday held, in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08-678, that a party may not immediately appeal court discovery orders that require the disclosure of documents and information covered by the attorney-client privilege.  This holding resolves a split in the circuits and will change the law in at least the DC and Ninth Circuits. The unanimous Court rejected the argument that attorney-client privilege disclosure rulings are different from other kinds of orders because once the privilege is lost, it cannot ever be restored. The Court (in Justice Sotomayor’s first opinion) noted that the ultimate remedy lies in reversal and a new trial at which the materials at issue would not be disclosed. Justice Sotomayor stated:

"The question before us is whether disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, we hold that they do not. Postjudgment appeals, together with other review mechanisms, suffice to protect the rights of litigants and preserve the vitality of the attorney-client privilege."

This is not a particularly revolutionary decision. After all, the Court has, for several terms, been narrowing interlocutory appellate rights as, at the same time, also requiring specific pleading (see, e.g.,Ashcroft v. Iqbal) in an effort to reduce expensive litigation proceedings. Moreover, at oral argument in the case, the primary issue came down to whether the attorney-client privilege was sufficiently important to warrant interlocutory appeal when balanced against the policy interests of the finality rule. Why, the justices asked, should the attorney-client privilege be given greater deference than trade secrets, for example?  My D.C. partner Stuart M. Gerson notes that for practitioners, both litigators and others who may be involved in investigations later subject to litigation, the significance of this holding is that heightened attention should be given to how privileged information is recorded to minimize the impact if that information is later disclosed. As a safeguard against disclosure, Stuart adds, experienced litigators and investigators tend to write cryptically and briefly, if at all, when they take notes. If one is inclined to take the formal statement of a witness to lock him or her into a particular rendition of fact, it should be done with the expectation that the statement very well may ultimately be disclosed, even if the statement is made in the context of an Upjohn investigation. Of course none of this changes the prevailing rule that attorney-client privilege can only be overcome upon a showing of critical necessity. However, courts dislike privilege and frequently misapply the law.  So, be careful out there.

Filed under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Court, Discovery, Justice Sotomayor, Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, Orders", Privilege, Stuart M. Gerson, Upjohn Tagged with ,

National Suture Class Action Rejected

By on December 2, 2009

The Mass Tort Defense Blog reported recently that the North Carolina federal district court overseeing the MDL concerning panacryl sutures declined last week to certify a proposed national class action in In re Panacryl Sutures Products Liability Cases, 2009 WL 3874347 (E.D.N.C. 11/13/09).  The decision is a significant one for pharmaceutical and medical device MDL practitioners because the court’s reasoning in denying class certification is broadly applicable to other medical device products. It is increasingly rare for plaintiffs to obtain class certification in medical device litigation and this case is no exception. Panacryl Sutures are synthetic, braided, absorbable surgical sutures, designed to remain in a patient’s body for 24-36 months after surgery to provide wound support. Various plaintiffs alleged that Panacryl Sutures were defective in that they allegedly caused a high rate of foreign body reactions when used as directed. Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate warning of the dangers associated with the devices. Plaintiffs eventually filed a motion to certify a National Class Action. The Panacryl sutures were the subject of a  2006 recall by FDA.

In his blog post, Dechert’s Sean P Wajert, discusses the various rationale underlying the court’s decision not to certify a national class. In evaluating the requirements under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b), the court considered the impact that the laws of the various states where plaintiffs reside would have on the proposed class.  Considering Rule 23(a)(3)’s "typicality" requirement, the court found that the plaintiffs had not considered the varying substantive laws governing every class member.  Considering to Rule 23(b), the court found that in class actions governed by the laws of several states, variations in state law often overwhelmed common issues.  The court held that the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate by "extensive analysis" that the laws of interested jurisdictions did not pose "insuperable obstacles" to class certification.  As Mr. Wajert points out, courts have generally found that common questions of fact do not predominate in medical device products cases. In the Panacryl Sutures litigation, the sutures were used in a variety of surgical procedures, which required different techniques and skill sets on the part of the surgeon and presented different risks of post-operative complications.  Thus, it is not likely that any class would have been certified due to a lack of predominance of common issues, let alone a national class. For a further discussion of the policy and legal considerations that warrant denial of class actions in pharmaceutical and medical device litigation, take a look at the enthusiastic discussion of the decision in the Drug and Device Law Blog authored by Jim Beck and Dechert and Mark Herrmann at Jones Day.

Filed under Class Actions, Commonality, drug and medical device litigation, jim beck, mark herrmann, national class action, Rule 23(a), Rule 23(a)(3), sean wajert, suture litigation, Typicality Tagged with

No Medical Monitoring Without Physical Harm

By on November 11, 2009

BNA Toxics Law Reporter reported this morning that a Rhode Island trial court in Providence rejected a  claim for medical monitoring by the mother of a child suffering from lead poisoning, in the absence of any physical manifestation of harm related to the diseases that plaintiff’s expert contends the child is now at greater risk of developing.  Although the court found that the plaintiff had submitted sufficient medical evidence to permit her to sue for compensatory damages for her son’s alleged cognitive deficits due to lead exposure, she failed to prove that her son manifested a sign or symptom of the diseases for which she believed medical monitoring was warranted.  In denying the claim, Judge Alice Bridget Gibney, in Miranda v. Dacruz, R.I. Super Ct., No. PC 04-2210, 10/26/09) held that, "This Court is not persuaded to open the damages flood gates to indefinite future monitoring". Judge Gibney distinguished the case before her from Donovan v.  Philip Morris USA, Inc., in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled last month that a medical monitoring claim by long-term smokers related to the early detection of lung cancer could proceed.  In that case, Judge Gibney noted, plaintiffs exhibited sub-cellular or other physiological changes, which although not symptoms of a disease, are warning signs.  I believe Donovan sets a dangerous precedent.  The "damages flood gates" that concerned Judge Gibney are more likely to open if the burden of medical monitoring plaintiffs is reduced to demonstrating a sub-cellular or physiological change rather than an injury or disease.  Under this loosened standard, a sun tan, a skin blemish, a sneeze or elevated cholesterol could justify permitting a medical monitoring claim to proceed.

Filed under BNA Toxics Law Reporter, Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc, Judge Alice Bridget Gibney, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Medical Monitoring, sub-cellular or other physiological changes Tagged with ,

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